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O'NEILL & CO. v. CRUMMITT
THE TORT LIABILITY OF THE PROPRIETOR OF A
PASSENGER ELEVATOR
O'Neill & Co. v. Crummitt1
Plaintiff-appellee, while shopping in the defendant's
department store, boarded a passenger elevator provided
by the defendant for the transportation of customers. On
arrival at the plaintiff's destination, the elevator attendant
stopped the car with its floor about four inches above the
landing. As the plaintiff sought to step down, the elevator
suddenly dropped. The plaintiff lost her balance, and as
she touched the floor, she slipped upon "a dirty, greasy
substance" which partially covered a strip of linoleum on
the landing, thereby sustaining injury. The plaintiff re-
covered a judgment against the defendant on a claim based
upon the negligent operation of the elevator by the de-
fendant's agent, and upon the negligent condition of the
elevator landing. The trial court refused to grant the
demurrer prayers offered by the defendant. On appeal,
held: Affirmed. The plaintiff's status at the time of the
injury was that of a passenger on the elevator. Therefore,
the defendant owed to the plaintiff the duty of exercising
the highest degree of care and diligence practical under
the circumstances for the latter's safety. In view of the
evidence, it could not be said as a matter of law that the
defendant fulfilled its duty; and the trial court properly
allowed the case to go to the jury.
In determining the tort liability of proprietors and
operators of passenger elevators for injuries caused to
those who are expressly or impliedly invited to ride there-
in, the courts have almost uniformly imposed upon the
former the same legal duty of care and caution which rests
upon common carriers with respect to the safe transporta-
tion of the latter's passengers. Some courts have obtained
this result by apparently holding that a passenger elevator
is a common carrier.2 Others have reached this conclusion
by analogy based upon the common elements of danger to
the individual found in many types of carriage and the de-
sirability of imposing a strict accountability with respect
thereto.' A minority of jurisdictions have refused to ap-
ply the strict liability of the common carrier to such a
1 172 Md. 53, 190 At. 763 (1937).
See Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 N. E. 953 (1901).
'See Fox v. City of Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 Atl. 356 (1904).
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situation either by means of direct identification, by anal-
ogy, or by other methods.4
A review of several cases dealing with the different
points of view, including a brief survey of the relevant
Maryland decisions, will serve to illustrate the real nature
of the problem involved and the reasons behind the vari-
ous solutions offered.
Treadwell v. Whittier,5 a California decision, is a lead-
ing case supporting the majority view. There, the plain-
tiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries caused
by the falling of a passenger elevator operated by the de-
fendants in their store where the plaintiff had gone on
business. The court held that the defendants owed the
same degree of care that would be required of a railroad
or stage-coach company in the carriage of their passen-
gers, and in California this entailed the utmost care and
diligence of very eautious persons. This responsibility
was said to be based upon the undertaking to carry human
beings whose lives and limbs and health are of great im-
portance, to the public as well as to the individuals them-
selves. The court used the following words, which have
quite often been quoted in subsequent cases:
"Persons who are lifted by elevators are sub-
jected to great risks to life and limb. They are
hoisted vertically, and are unable, in case of the break-
ing of the machinery, to help themselves. The person
running such elevator must be held to undertake to
raise such persons safely, as far as human care and
foresight will go. . . . Such responsibility attaches to
all persons engaged in employments where human be-
ings submit their bodies to their control, by which their
lives or limbs are put at hazard. . . . We know of no
employment where the law should demand a higher
degree of care and diligence than in the case of the
persons using and running elevators for lifting human
beings from one level to another."
Springer v. Ford6 is another decision exemplifying the
majority view-point. The plaintiff, an employee of a ten-
ant in the defendant's building, was injured in the fall of
' See Edwards v. Mfrs'. Bldg. Co., 27 R. 1. 248, 61 At. 646 (1905);
GrLffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901) ; Burgess v. Stowe,
134 Mich. 204, 96 N. W. 29 (1903).
880 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266 (1889).
189 Ill. 430, 59 N. E. 953 (1901).
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an elevator in said building.7 The court held that the
proprietor of such an elevator was a common carrier of
passengers for hire, and that the compensation was the
rental paid by the tenant. In addition, the court stated:
"The operators of such elevators, upon the grounds
of public policy, are required to exercise the highest
degree of care and diligence. The lives and safety
of a large number of human beings are intrusted to
their care and the law requires them to use extraor-
dinary diligence in and about the operation of such
elevators to prevent injury to passengers carried
thereon."
The minority view upon the subject is well set forth in
Edwards v. Manufacturers' Building Co.' The plaintiff
was an employee of one of the defendant's tenants and was
injured by the falling of an elevator which the defendant
maintained and operated in its building for the use of its
tenants and their employees and customers. The Court
fully recognized the existence of the decisions holding that
an elevator operator was a common carrier owing the high-
est degree of care to its passengers, but it refused to as-
sent to the reasoning upon which such opinions were os-
tensibly based. Said the Court:
"The rule (as to the liability of the common car-
rier) is imposed not on account of the danger of the
journey, but because of his relation to the public. If
a private person transports a friend in his coach or in
his automobile, he is liable only for want of ordinary
care, though the danger may be the same as in travel-
ing by public coach or by railway. The duty of a
landlord towards those who enter upon his premises
by implied invitation is to exercise reasonable care for
their safety, and we see no reason for modifying the
rule when he introduces and operates an elevator. He
is not, like a common carrier, a servant of the public.
His relations and duties are with a limited number of
persons who have contracted with him for the use of
In this case, the elevator was primarily used for freight. To the de-
fendant's contention that the principles of law applicable to passenger
elevators should not be applied to freight elevators carrying passengers,
the court replied, "There Is no reason, in principle, why the analogy held
to exist between passenger and freight trains, as common carriers, does not
exist between passenger and freight elevators, In cases where the owners
of freight elevators permit the carriage of passengers thereon for hire."
The court stated that the measure of liability was the same in both cases.
8 27 R. I. 248, 61 Atl. 646 (1905).
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his premises, and others who have business with his
tenants."
Griffen v. Manice,9 a New York ease, also supports the
minority approach. Here, the plaintiff's intestate was also
the employee of a tenant of the defendant. He was killed
when elevator weights fell down the shaft into the passenger
car. The lower court instructed the jury that the elevator
proprietor was subject to the same rule that applied to a
railroad company in the care of its machinery, namely, the
utmost care and diligence. This instruction was declared
to be erroneous by the appellate court. The latter court
reasoned along the lines of the Manufacturers' Building
Co. case, acknowledging the danger involved in the opera-
tion of an elevator, but pointing out that there were other
equally dangerous appliances in modern buildings, such
as steam boilers and open hatchways, and that it was not
customary to impose upon the building owner any greater
responsibility as to those things than that of exercising
reasonable care. In conclusion, the court said:
"In the exercise of the same degree of care differ-
ent degrees of precaution may be necessary. . . . So,
the more dangerous an appliance may be, the more at-
tention may be requisite. If the fair purport of the
charge of the court was only that the care should be
commensurate with the danger, it might not be objec-
tionable. The charge, however, goes far beyond this.
The utmost human care and foresight would require
the owner of a building to use the most modern and
improved form of elevator, the latest successful me-
chanical device, and the most skilfull operators. Such
is the rule in the operation of railroads. . . . But
common knowledge informs us that such a rule would
be unreasonable applied to elevators in ordinary
buildings."
The leading case in Maryland having to do with the
tort liability of passenger elevator proprietors is Belvedere
Building Co. v. Bryan."0 Prior to that decision, however,
there were two other cases concerning tort suits arising
from injuries sustained in connection with elevators, name-
ly, Peoples Bank v. Morgolofski, "I and Wise v. Ackerman. 2
In both of these cases the elevators involved were com-
9 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901).
10 103 Md. 514, 64 At. 44 (1906).
"75 Md. 432, 23 AtI. 1027, 32 A. S. R. 403 (1892).
"76 Md. 375, 25 AtI. 424 (1892).
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bination passenger and freight elevators ;13 in the Morgo-
lofski decision, the injured party was an employee of de-
fendant's tenant; in the Ackerman case the plaintiff was
an employee of the defendant himself ;14 in both cases the
plaintiffs' prayers were based on the theory that the de-
fendant owed the duty of ordinary care and prudence only.
In Belvedere Building Co. v. Bryan, the plaintiff, while
a guest in the defendant's hotel, was injured when the
hotel passenger elevator suddenly dropped as he was pre-
paring to leave the car. In a subsequent successful suit
against the defendant company, the trial court instructed
that the elevator proprietor owed to the plaintiff the high-
est degree of care and diligence practicable under the cir-
cumstances. The Maryland Court of Appeals stated that
the question of the degree of care required in the operation
of a passenger elevator had never been distinctly raised
and decided in the state before, and that the prior Morgo-
lofski and Ackerman cases did not conflict with the rule of
liability sought to be laid down by the plaintiff. The Court
distinguished the previous cases on their facts, and pointed
out that those decisions rested validly upon the theory of
ordinary care because the plaintiffs had phrased their
prayers in that manner, and that the trial court was not
bound to go beyond the request of the prayer offered, and
grant stronger law than was asked, even though it might
be able to do so if asked.
In the Belvedere Building Co. case, the Maryland Court
examined the various views of the different jurisdictions
and textwriters and finally cast its lot with that of the
majority of the states. The Court of Appeals criticized,
in passing, the minority view, in general, and the case of
Griffen v. Manice,5 in particular. With reference to the
basis of the latter decision, the Maryland Court said:
See supra n. 7.
' See Walsh v. Cullen, 235 Ill. 91, 85 N. E. 223 (1908); and, Putnam v.
Pacific Monthly Co., 68 Or. 36, 130 Pac. 986 (1913), for a holding that the
elevator owes a different duty to his own employees from that owed to
third parties, namely, ordinary care to the former and the highest degree
of care to the latter.
In the Ackerman case, supra n, 13, the Maryland Court said that where
employees of the proprietor ride upon a freight elevator for their own
pleasure or convenience they accept the risks incident to such an appliance
and can only require of the elevator proprietor the use of ordinary care
in the construction and operation of the machine, but that if said employees
are directed to use such an elevator in the course of their employment, the
employer controlling the machine must exercise "great care". Any such
distinction is presumably obviated where the particular employment is
covered by the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act.
"166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901). See also 8upra n. 4, and n. 9,
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"With great respect for that eminent Court this
reasoning seems to us to lay out of view the true
ground upon which all the cases sustain the rule
(of the 'highest degree of care') laid down in the lower
court. The liability of the common carrier is not im-
posed because he is a common carrier, but because he
is a carrier of passengers. The liability is not im-
posed upon the owner or occupant of real property as
such, but irrespective of such ownership and occu-
pancy, and because he is engaged in the undertaking
of running an elevator as a means of personal trans-
portation. .
Following the Belvedere Building Co. decision there
appeared the Maryland case of Owners' Realty Co. v.
Richardson.6 There, the plaintiff was an employee of an
occupant of the defendant's apartment house. The plain-
tiff was injured when the gate of an automatic elevator
suddenly closed upon her finger as she was attempting to
get into the car. In the course of its opinion, the Court
said:
"The rule approved by this court is that the land-
lord engaged in transporting passengers by elevators
must exercise great care not only in their operation
but in providing safe and suitable equipment. It is a
rule which has its sanction in sound public policy,
which exacts a high degree of care where security of
person and life is frequently involved, under circum-
stances in which the carrier is in control of the move-
ment or of the equipment."
The Court decided that there was testimony in the case
which, if believed, tended to show that the defendant did
not exercise the highest care consistent with the practical
operation of the business in which it was engaged to have
the elevator fit for such use.
There is something favorable to be said about both the
majority and the minority viewpoints; but it is submitted
that, assuming the "degrees of care" doctrine to be sound
in principle," the majority approach is more consistent,
U 158 Md. 367, 148 Atl. 543 (1929).
" Perhaps the majority of jurisdictions, Including Maryland, have
adopted the "degrees of care" negligence doctrine. The degree of care
owed will vary with the relationship involved. Thus, a mere ballee owes
the duty of "ordinary care", while the obligation to exercise "the highest
degree of care" is imposed upon the common carrier. There can be little
doubt but that a substantial difference exists between the various levels of
care in the minds of many of the courts which apply them. This fact is
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logically speaking, and is more desirable from the stand-
point of public safety and well-being. The rationale of
the minority view in the opinions cited above seems to be
based upon the following contentions: (1) That the ele-
vator owner is not bound to serve all in the manner re-
quired of the common carrier, and that as the extraordi-
nary tort liability of the latter is predicated upon this obli-
gation of equal and universal servitude, the elevator pro-
prietor should not be considered a common carrier and be
burdened with the responsibility thereof; (2) that there
is no reason to impose the rule of strict accountability upon
a landlord or building owner who operates an elevator as
an exception to the traditional requirement of ordinary
care for the safety of invitees. In rebuttal, the majority
view argues: (1) That the legal status of the elevator
proprietor should coincide with that of the common car-
rier because of the similar characteristics involved; (2)
that the true reason for the common carrier tort liability
principle is based upon the hazard of the carriage to the
passenger, which danger is equally present in elevator
transportation; (3) that the principles concerned transcend
any rule applied to landlords and building owners as such.
As to the minority view contention that the elevator
proprietor's relation to the public does not warrant the
imposition of an obligation to serve all equally, it would
be pertinent to point out that, in view of the ever increasing
importance which passenger elevators are playing in the
socio-economic development of modern civilization, espe-
cially in urban districts, it would hardly be unreasonable
to demand such an obligation in the interest of the public
illustrated by the quotation from the Griffen case. It is also emphasized
in Burgess v. Stowe, supra n. 4, where the Court stated that an elevator
operator was bound to use only the care required of an ordinarily prudent
person under the circumstances, i. e. "ordinary care", and that In reference
to the operation of an elevator this would call for a high degree of care be-
cause of the danger involved. But the Court refused to sustain a charge
that the elevator owner was bound to exercise the "highest degree of care"
of a cautious person, because the Court felt that an elevator proprietor
should not have such an extraordinary obligation resting upon him, assum-
ing It to exist in other relations.
For a criticism of the use of the "degrees of care" principle see Union
Traction Co. v. Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655 (1919). This case
suggests that the employment of such terms as "slight care", "great care",
and "highest degree of care", when used In reference to certain peculiar
relations, are misleading and constitute an invasion of the province of the
jury, and that the duty to exercise care is always the same regardless of
the nature of the relation out of which It arises. This duty is that of "due
care", namely, what a person of ordinary prudence would do under the
circumstances, and this depends upon the danger involved in any given




welfare in situations where the public interest would be
most closely affected. Even in the absence of the finding
of a holding out by elevator proprietors to serve all who
legitimately offer themselves to be carried in the line of
some activity connected with the elevator owner's busi-
ness, the fact that a large part of the public is actually
carried in such a manner makes the distinction between
elevator operators and the traditional common carrier a
merely technical one with respect to their relation to the
public in any consideration of tort liability based upon the
safety of the public in solido.
It is interesting to note that the Maryland Court's in-
terpretation of the majority rule found in the Belvedere
Building Co. case seems to predicate the elevator proprie-
tor's responsibility upon the duty owed to the individual
qua individual and not as a member of a large elevator-
passenger public. The Court went as far as to say that
the liability of the common carrier is not imposed on ac-
count of the public relation involved, but because of the
danger of carriage necessitating a greater degree of care
for the safety of the passengers than that of ordinary care.
It would seem more logical that such a responsibility should
be based both upon the public relation and the hazard of
the journey, but, in any event, even if the danger to the
particular individual is the controlling reason for the rule,
it is submitted that the principle receives increased sup-
port when the social significance of public carriage is
added. The analysis of the Maryland Court emphasizes
the passive helplessness of the passenger in the hands of
a transportation company, be it the accepted common car-
rier or the elevator operator, and thus stresses the exist-
ence of personal transportation rather than public car-
riage.
Proponents of the minority rule protest against the in-
consistency of the adherents of the majority viewpoint in
refusing to apply the principle contended for to other
equally dangerous appliances found in modern life, such
as steam boilers in buildings and private automobile car-
riage. Perhaps this anomaly, if it does exist, lies in the
failure to see the relation involved rather than in any in-
consistency in the rule itself. The Maryland Court found
little difficulty in the objection that the majority rule would
impose an exception upon the "ordinary care" duty im-
posed upon landlords with respect to invitees. It pointed
out that the extraordinary tort liability of elevator oper-
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ators is not imposed upon the owners of real property as
such, but regardless of such ownership. There is an im-
plication that personal carriage, of a dangerous nature,
where the passenger's safety is subject to the operator's
control, is a situation calling for the highest degree of care
irrespective of the existence of any other legal status which
the carrier may at the same time assume. Of course, the
status of the passenger may modify the result, as it does
in other types of carriage.
The foregoing discussion has laid a great deal of em-
phasis upon relation of the elevator operator to the com-
mon carrier. However, it is apparent that most of the
cases involved, including the Maryland decisions, do not
hold that the elevator manager or owner is a common car-
rier for all purposes although they do hold that the com-
mon-law tort liability of both with respect to the safety of
the passengers carried is the same.
One would not take the cases as authority for treating
the passenger elevator as within the term "common car-
rier" as used in statutes imposing general regulations of a
business character upon public service companies."5 Even
in the interpretation of statutes dealing with the problem
of liability of common carriers for negligence, or of de-
fenses connected therewith, the courts have manifested a
reluctance to include the passenger elevator within the
term "common carrier"." Also, in California, which is
one of the jurisdictions following the majority rule," the
courts have refused to treat the passenger elevator as
within the meaning of an insurance policy protecting
against injury sustained while riding as a passenger on
any public conveyance provided by a "common carrier".21
Such decisions emphasize the need for keeping the com-
mon law rule of liability for negligence, as stated in the
instant case, distinct from any general classification of the
elevator as a common carrier.
"The problem of the possibility of such a carry-over is reduced in a
statute such as we have in Maryland which purports in early sections to
give a fairly exclusive definition of "common carriage" as used in the
law. See Md. Code, Art. 23, Sees. 346. 347, 348.
" Southern Ry. v. Taylor, 57 App. D. C. 21, 16 Fed. (2nd) 517 (1926),
noted (1927) 13 Va. L. Rev. 651; Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 329. 60
N. E. 795 (1901) ; and see 9 R. C. L. 1237 interpreting the latter case
saying, "When the question is squarely presented, as when it is sought to
construe a statute referring to the duties or liabilities of 'common carriers'
it is held that such expression does not refer to the proprietors of
elevators."
"C irca note 5.
2 Ogburn v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 56 Cal. App. Dec. 1177, 269 Pac.
728 (1928), noted (1929) 2 S. C. L. R. 301.
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